Posts filed under 'Business Models'
The management shuffle announced by
Yahoo recently is only the latest evidence of
strategy decay that pervades the leading ranks of the Internet business world. Yahoo says it made the changes to allow the company to move faster.Fine, but in what direction do they want to move? What does Yahoo! want to be when it grows up? And what does that imply for what it will choose not to do?
In our celebrity culture, we love to focus on people. Decker gained, Rosensweig is out, Braun is out, Semel’s still there, Yang’s mentioned, but where’s Filo and who the Hell is going to head up the audience group (and why can’t Yahoo find anyone internally to take this on)?
People matter, of course, but in this context strategy matters even more. Faster movement is dangerous if you have no sense of direction. It just means you do more things more quickly, spreading that peanut butter even more thinly. To paraphrase an old quote by Casey Stengel: “if you don’t know where you are going, you will never get there.”
And let’s not just single out Yahoo. I have a growing sense that all the major Internet players – Google, MSN, Amazon, Ebay and AOL – have lost their sense of direction and differentiation. Rather than carving out and rapidly enhancing areas of distinctive advantage, these major players appear to be leaping like lemmings into the red ocean.
Here are some of the red flags that give me cause for concern:
- Rather than helping people to connect more effectively with resources across the Web, they all seem increasingly focused on aggregating their own resources.
- They are becoming more and more obsessed with advertising revenue and risk losing focus on what is required to add more value to users. Advertising revenue is a dangerous narcotic – it shifts you more and more into a vendor mindset rather than a user mindset.
- They are investing large sums of money on infrastructure, further diverting time and attention away from development of new services for users (infrastructure services like Amazon’s EC2 and S3 are a very different business).
- They seem to be looking more and more at each other and trying to replicate each other’s services rather than focusing on the user and trying to be truly innovative in terms of new services.
Now, this growing homogenization of the leadership ranks might be understandable if the Internet were a maturing business arena. Given the rapid and sustained pace of innovation in the underlying technology, the rapid growth of usage, the continuing shift of spending to the Internet and the proliferation of new businesses created on the Internet, I find it hard to characterize this space as “maturing” – my sense is that it is still in its infancy.
Some observers have even begun to hail the emergence of “Internet conglomerates” as the wave of the future. Looking from the outside in, one can make explicit the assumptions that seem to be driving the investments, business initiatives and strategies of these leaders. These assumptions seem to converge on this view of the future: leading companies will be vertically integrated and horizontally integrated, offering a broad range of their own resources to users who will “settle” into their spaces. Certainly, the strategies of these companies seem to assume that Internet conglomerates are the wave of the future. Is this really the way the Internet will evolve as a business platform?
As I have written in Harvard Business Review, I believe that a quite different future will unfold, marked by a distinctive process of unbundling and re-bundling of firms. This perspective suggests that all the Internet leaders confront the same difficult choices that more traditional companies also face. Over time, will these companies choose to be customer relationship businesses, product innovation and commercialization businesses or infrastructure management businesses? None of the Internet leaders appear prepared to confront these choices yet.
Of course, there’s another interpretation of the initiatives pursued by the Internet leaders. They may be explicitly avoiding any view of the future and instead spreading their bets across many initiatives in the hope that some of these bets will pay off while others will prove to be dead-ends. Nick Carr refers to this as the spaghetti strategy – “throw a lot of stuff against the wall and see what sticks.”
As uncertainty increases, this has become the preferred “strategy” of many companies, not just in the Internet sphere. While strategy used to be viewed as the discipline of making choices, this approach proudly rejects the need to make any choices. It is a particularly seductive approach for large companies with lots of resources.
And yet this approach stands in sharp contrast to the strategies that enabled the Internet leaders to carve out their leadership positions in the first place. Unlike the thousands of other dot.com start-ups that embraced hustle as strategy and speed without direction, the founders of these companies started with a very clear, even though high-level, long-term destination in mind. It helped them to make difficult choices in the near-term and to launch waves of initiatives that cumulatively built very large and successful businesses. It has stood them very well in the first decade of their business.
In my own work, I use a FAST strategy methodology. It emphasizes the need to have a clear, but high-level view of a long-term destination while in parallel focusing on a limited number of high impact initiatives in the operations and organization that can accelerate movement towards this destination. What the Internet leaders seem to have lost is any distinctive long-term view of what kind of business they will need to build to remain successful in a rapidly evolving business landscape.
People can be moved in and out of executive positions. Large, high visibility acquisitions can be announced. “Strategic” relationships across leading companies can be negotiated. But without a clear and differentiated sense of long-term direction, all of these initiatives will make for good newspaper copy, but count for little in terms of sustained value creation.
February 2nd, 2007
Back in 1999, Peter Drucker wrote about “The Real Meaning of the Merger Boom.” In a punchy essay for the Conference Board’s Annual Report, the guru for all gurus proclaimed, “there is no merger boom today.” End of story.
In fact, he made clear that “in total dollar volume,” it was a zero sum game. De-mergers, unnoticed, were equal to the mergers. Moreover, “the majority of today’s mergers are defensive, the majority of yesterday’s were offensive.” If anything, this has simply become more the case in 2006 and 2007. For example, the major auto companies, so enamored of mergers for a while, have now taken to joint ventures. Many, many mergers today are consolidation plays, tactical efforts to hang on in dying businesses, pulling together wounded enterprises that think they can afford heart surgery when they are large enough to pay the bill.
Drucker could have gone on to point out that history is littered with mergers that subtracted value for shareholders and society. Even the wave of industry consolidations that have taken place from 2000-2007 may in the end prove strategically short-sighted –investments in dying industries without regard to tomorrow.
“The truly important developments in corporate and economic structure today are not the mergers and de-mergers. They are, largely unnoticed or at least unreported, new and different ways of corporate structure, corporate growth, and corporate strategy….the real boom has been in alliances of all kinds, such as partnerships, a big business buying a minority stake in a small one, cooperative agreements in research or marketing, joint ventures, and, often, ‘handshake agreements’ with few formal and legally binding controls behind them.”
Drucker spotted the real boom – alliances. But an utter fascination with the doings of Wall Street, even in our highest political councils, has distracted all of us, riveting us on merger headlines and concealing from us this deep enduring trend of our time.
The most adroit of a new breed of global chief executive gets it. Such is Carlos Ghosn who turned around Japan’s Nissan Auto, peeling away layers of fat instead of adding extraneous divisions. He went from massive losses to $7 billion in profits and wiped out $23 billion of debt. Nissan’s 11% operating profit margin has made it the most profitable of the world’s big automakers (See Economist, February 26, 2005, p. 66). Now to head Renault as well, Ghosn has said that the power of the alliance between them lies “in its respect for the identities of the two companies, and on the other, in the necessity of developing synergies.” If Nissan had been fused with Renault, failure would have followed.
We ourselves are very aware of the negatives that crop up with mergers. It was only a short time after Allegheny Airlines absorbed PSA and Piedmont Airlines (both better companies than it incidentally) that the combined market value of the three added up to less than the value of each of the components prior to their homogenization. This unhappy trinity, once known as Agony Airlines to wags in the Northeast, has since become the teetering bankrupt U.S. Airways, affectionately called UseLess Airways by its passengers. After many false re-starts, it is hoped that America West’s management, which took over U.S. Air, can run the new combined airline to better effect.
As well, one can not overestimate the size of the merger friction costs imposed by investment bankers, lawyers, and accountants who created and distorted this and other stillborn combinations. Reduced friction costs for continuing operations have traditionally been the excuse for bloated business combinations and expensive asset bases, but this does not at all account for the absolutely horrendous sunk costs imposed by middlemen in the merger/de-merger process. In fact, the mechanics of mergering themselves often distort the shape of the resulting enterprise, creating a lumbering creature nobody envisioned. But the financial and strategic costs that lard the merger process are well obscured by the middlemen and their sales people who make such a good living off of such transactions.
There are broad conceptual reasons as well why a collaborative model free of hierarchy and legalistic strictures is productive of much more economic value. With increasing amounts of the work to be done by corporations in advanced economies consisting of knowledge and professional services chores involving far different workflows, the fuel for business activity consists of pockets of intelligence that are broadly distributed throughout the world, often outside the corporation. One cannot accumulate the human resources one needs to play on a global scale within one’s walls. Organizations need to tap into a multitude of other organizations. And they need to avail themselves of workers strewn about the globe—some in outsourcing companies and others entirely on their own.
Charles Handy finds that “many organizations have more people working outside them than they have inside them.” Furthermore, “only about half the working population is working inside an organization.” The successful company, with perhaps only 20% of its workforce on its own payrolls, has to learn to virtually coordinate companies and independent workers who are bound to it by no more than a handshake. Handy chats about this brave new world in “The Future of Work in a Changing World” in an interview with Aurora Online.
For the past 10 years the goal of our own staff has been to divine the rules of the road for the still emerging collaborative enterprise. In every way, they fly in the face of all the dogmas we laid out for the corporation in the 20th century. For this reason, the postulates of collaboration are usually counter-intuitive. Consider here just two examples:
Rule 1: At best the chief executive should be a fish out of water. Take a look at Nissan. Carlos Ghosn was born in Brazil in a Lebanese immigrant family, then had a French education first in Lebanon and later at the Ecole Polytechnique where he studied engineering. For openers he turned around Michelin, the tire company, in Brazil to begin with, then in America. He went on to become a cost-cutter at Renault. Louis Schweitzer, the very original business mind who headed up Renault, posted him to Nissan with little in-France business experience and not even a smidgeon of Japanese grounding in his system. But he was effective because he could bring a pan-global outsider’s objectivity to Nissan. He succeeded in part because he was an alien from outer space. He was the stranger who could see what makes the natives tick and who had no sentimental ties to sever as he cleaned house.
Rule 2: The best alliances are very, very unlikely. For instance, Kirin Beer, once the IBM of the Japanese beer business, came to George Rathmann of Amgen as he was getting ready to ramp up production of Epogen. It contributed its fermentation production techniques to the biotech company, as well as a slug of capital. Rathmann has since acknowledged that its role was central to the growth of Amgen into a multi-billion dollar company. Most likely, a start up will find that the process knowledge it really needs lies 10,000 miles away in a dramatically different industry and in a vastly different culture. But, of course, the Japanese bring special skills and excellence to manufacturing which is why, as we used to say, that the American dream got interrupted by the Japanese clock radio.
Alliances are best, then, if they overcome all the inbreeding tendencies of conventional businessmen. The dynamics of mergerdom tend to preclude such unlikely alliances.
What’s at issue here is how to devise an organizational model that encourages rapid, insistent global learning by an organization. As we have said elsewhere in “Better Learning Networks,” (see item #187) researchers at the Santa Fe Institute have come to understand that there is an optimal coupling within an organization that encourages learning. It is simply too hard for knowledge to interpenetrate an organization where the bonds are made of steel rather than nervous tissue.
Those who think about software systems have come up with the same insight in respect to information systems. Ubiquity interviewed us about collaboration a while back. There we reference an article by John Seely Brown and John Hagel called “The Joy of Flex” in which they said, “”Loose coupling makes it easier to improvise without worrying about disruptions elsewhere in the system.” While hardwired systems afford short-term cost advantages, they are costly in the end, since they cannot accommodate the disruptions imposed by global realities. Likewise, we would contend, merged companies achieve a rigidity that is antagonistic to agile behavior.
If alliances are the fluid organizational form that should dominate our business activity, many head-in-the-sand executives don’t know it. Squabblers debate about the value of strategic alliances and how to make them work. This is all rather academic. Alliances are very much a fact of life in our lean business society, and so the only option for the business generalissimo is to saddle up the horse and see if he can ride this new kind of stallion.
Well, the future is always a bit uncomfortable until it is past.
January 29th, 2007
Senior executives need simple, but very powerful frameworks that help them to think strategically, and to align people in the organization through the use of a common strategic language.
The three box thinking model is an example of a framework that I use to facilitate strategic thinking and alignment.
Actions companies take belong in one of three boxes:
Box 1 — manage the present;
Box 2 — selectively abandon the past; and
Box 3 — create the future.
Box 1 is about improving current businesses. Box 2 and Box 3 are about breakout performance and growth.
Many organizations restrict their strategic thinking to Box 1. This tendency has been particularly acute in the past two to three years, as most leaders have emphasized reducing costs and improving margins in their current businesses.
But strategy cannot be just about what an organization needs to do to secure profits for the next year. Strategy must encompass Box 2 and Box 3. It must be about what a company needs to do to sustain leadership for the next ten years. In fact, the central task of an organization’s leaders is to balance managing the present with creating the future. Examples of successful Box 2 and Box 3 initiatives include: Dell’s direct model in the PC industry, Wal-Mart’s transformation of the discount retailing industry, Apple’s introduction of iPod, and Southwest Airlines’ revolution in the airline industry.
Organizations that operate within a short timeframe base their actions on the assumption that their industry is stable and static. But it takes years for large organizations to change directions. If you take this into account, change is rapid and nonlinear. For instance, nanotechnology and genetic engineering are revolutionizing the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries. Globalization is opening doors to emerging economies, such as India and China, and billions of customers with vast unmet needs. Once-distinct industries, such as mass-media entertainment, telephony, and computing, are converging. Rapidly escalating concerns about security and the environment are creating unforeseen markets. And other, more subtle changes are important as well, such as the trend toward more empowered customers, the aging population in the developed world, and the rising middle class in the developing world.
As a result of these forces, companies find their strategies need almost constant reinvention because the old assumptions are no longer valid, or the previous strategy has been imitated and commoditized by competitors, or changes in the industry environment offer unanticipated opportunities. The only way to stay ahead is to innovate.
Part of the job of executives is to make money with the current strategy. That is the challenge in Box 1. Part of their job is to make up for the decay and commoditization of strategy. That is the challenge in Box 2 and Box 3.
Too many companies ignore these two boxes until it is too late.
January 4th, 2007
What do Michael Porter, Bono, and The Gap have in common?
They’re all related to “The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy.” The HBR article, by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, proposes a fundamentally new way to look at the relationship between business and society that does not treat corporate growth and social welfare as a zero-sum game.
They introduce a framework that individual companies can use to identify the social consequences of their actions; to discover opportunities to benefit society and themselves by strengthening the competitive context in which they operate; to determine which CSR initiatives they should address; and to find the most effective ways of doing so.
Perceiving social responsibility as an opportunity rather than as damage control or a PR campaign requires dramatically different thinking—a mind-set, the authors warn, that will become increasingly important to competitive success.
The framework identifies three ways in which social issues should be prioritized:
- Generic: Social issues that are not significantly affected by a company’s operations nor materially affect its long-term competitiveness.
- Value Chain: Social issues that are significantly affected by a company’s activities in the ordinary course of business.
- Competitive Context: Social issues in the external environment that significantly affect the underlying drivers of a company’s competitiveness in the locations where it operates.
Case studies? Porter gives us a few examples: Whole Foods, Microsoft, GE, Volvo etc. Some of his examples are weak (ExxonMobil building roads is not exactly CSR, or is it?)
What’s truly great about this article is the diagram mapping the societal impact of the value chain ( pp.86-87). In it, Porter shows us how companies can start analyzing it’s “inside-out” linkages to see where it can do the most good — for society and itself.
Which brings us to The Gap. Duke grad-student Jeremy MacNealey writes:
“The apparel retailer has struggled mightily over the past few years, but we learned that the company may have found new hope from the most unlikely of sources — its charitable efforts. Teaming up with (Product) Red and launching a new apparel line called Gap (Product) Red, it has seen an overwhelming response by consumers to the edgier and more premium product. The response by the public has been so strong that the company is now planning to apply a similar look throughout the Gap brand. It just may be that the long-awaited turnaround that investors have anticipated will actually come about in part as a result of Gap’s charitable efforts.”
More about Product Red here >>
December 30th, 2006
Here’s a report you’ll be interested in: The Globalization of White-Collar Work: The Facts and Fallout of Next-Generation Offshoring from Duke’s Fuqua School of Business and Booz Allen Hamilton.
The news? Apparently offshoring is no longer “all about moving jobs elsewhere; increasingly, it’s about sourcing talent everywhere.”
And: “…what used to be a tactical labor cost-saving exercise is now a strategic imperative of competing for talent globally. White-collar work can be performed where it makes the most sense and saves the most cents. More important, a looming shortage of technically trained talent, such as engineers and computer scientists, in advanced economies will require the ability to source and manage such talent globally.”
Here are the 5 main points:
1. Labor arbitrage is giving way to accessing talent as the primary driver of next-generation offshoring.
2. Offshoring high-skilled functions does not replace jobs onshore.
3. Companies look elsewhere because they can’t get it at home.
4. Where you offshore depends on what you offshore.
5. The obstacles to successful offshoring are increasingly internal and organizational.
The reports also says that higher skilled jobs (like R&D, Marketing, and Design) won’t go away because of this growing global talent shortage. Instead firms will compete globally for brain power, regardless of location.
Sorry, I don’t buy that. China’s working hard on educating the next generation of designers, and in India you’re going to see the next generation of innovation. (I’ll get John Hagel to talk about this soon.)
December 25th, 2006
Wired’s Chris Anderson writes about the effect of the Internet on media industries in the Economist’s The World in 2007:
“The web takes its victims one at a time. First, in the mid-1990s, print media started to feel the terrifying effect of losing their monopoly on publication…in the early 2000s, the same thing happened to music…Now it’s television’s turn. In 2007 TV will have its first “music moment”—the realisation that a core audience (the 18-34-year-old male) has moved online, possibly for good.”
The key insight: “Short, user-created videos are creating a new kind of watching experience, one more about “snacking” than half-hour sitcoms.”
This is all about building future business models around attention spans. No one has time to read Harvard Business Review, or listen to an entire music CD, or watch the whole movie.
Our attention span is now somewhere between 3 to 5 minutes. That’s the size your idea-bite has to be if you’re going get heard at all.
December 25th, 2006
Next Posts